Alaska territory ) ) ss The United States of America )
To: The President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, Senators, and Representatives.
Article I
Oath of Office *
1. True name is: Constitution of the United States *
2. Proof of true name - Constitution of the United States *
3. Form of Oath *
4. Who shall take the Oath several States *
5. Of the several States -when shall the Oath be taken *
6. How appointed or elected shall take Oath several States *
7. Who shall administer the Oath several States *
8. There shall be a written record of the Oath several States *
Article II *
Judges appear to do justice in outlaw Courts not created by the constitution or the legislature *
Article III *
Employee Affidavit *
Article IV *
Civil Commission *
Article V *
License to Practice Law in the State *
Article VI *
Dual Citizenship *
Article VII *
Appearing to do Justice from Courts that do not exist. *
Article VIII *
Judges, Justices, Magistrates ignore the Enacted Laws of the Legislature *
Article IX *
No Bar Member can be a Judge in a court of Record *
Article X *
No Official Bond and is a mere Employee. *
Article XI *
Judicial officer defined, disqualification, and Oregon statute is source of the Law *
Article XII *
Compiled Laws are not true laws must read the original statute(s) *
Article XIII *
We are entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance *
Article XIV *
Where a court is without jurisdiction, its acts and proceedings are void *
Article XV *
Crimes do not escape punishment, because they have not ripened into treason. *
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, on the 11th day of August, in the year of our Lord, 1989, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the first Act of Congress of 1 Stat 23, Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and laws of the State of Alaska, subscribe to an Oath of Office in violation, to wit:
Specification First. This Oath of Office as a public officer is unlawful as it does not comply with the mandatory words arising under the Act of Statute I of Congress of Volume 1 on page 23, and Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska.Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 28.
Specification Second. This Oath of Office as a public officer is unlawful and unconstitutional as the mandatory Oath of Office of a public officer arising under Act of Statute I of Congress of Volume 1 on page 23, and Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska shall be taken before entering the duties of his public office. Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 28.
Specification Third. This Oath of Office of a public officer is unconstitutional and unlawful the Oath of Office arising under the sixth Article of the Constitution of the United State, the very first Act of Congress approved on June 1, 1789 on page 23 of Volume 1, and the Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State mandates that the Oath of Office shall be to the "Constitution of the United States" and not the "Constitution of the United States of America." Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3, and Exhibit 28.
Specification Fourth. This Oath of Office as a public officer is unlawful and unconstitutional as the Oath is to do business, and appear to do justice "for the State of Alaska." Therefore in the court room we have three entities representing the State of Alaska, (1) a prosecutor "for the State of Alaska", (2) the court, being the "SUPERIOR/DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA", Exhibit 29, and (3) a judge issuing process and making decisions as "judicial officer for the State of Alaska" in Exhibit 28. The word "for" means in lieu of, for the benefit of, and/or representing. This therefore can never be a court of justice in these outlaw courts with the judge, prosecutor and court operating for the State of Alaska. And further the Oath of Office for a public officer is to be for a specific public office, not as a "judicial officer for the State of Alaska." Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3.
This body shall take Mandatory Judicial Notice of the Act of Congress approved on June 1, 1789 on page 23 of Volume 1, and in particular section 3, to wit:
"SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the members of the several State legislatures, at the next sessions of the said legislatures, respectively, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who have been heretofore chosen or appointed, or who shall be chosen or appointed before the first day of August next, and who shall then be in office, shall, within one month thereafter, take the same oath or affirmation, except where they shall have taken it before; which may be administered by any person authorized by the law of the State, in which such office shall be holden, to administer oaths. And the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who shall be chosen or appointed after the said first day of August, shall, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, take the foregoing oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the person or person, who by the law of the State shall be authorized to administer the oath of office; and the person or persons so administering the oath hereby required to be taken, shall cause a record or certificate thereof to be made, in the same manner, as, by the law of the State, he or they shall be directed to record or certify the oath of office." [Emphasis added]
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
The following is evidence of the true name of the "Constitution of the United States" and the Oath of Office mandated for the public officers of the several States.
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice of the only one true, correct and complete name of the written instrument of the organic and fundamental law of 1789 arising under "this Constitution for the United States of America" in the Preamble, to wit:
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." [Emphasis added.] Exhibit 3
and arising under the sixth article of this Constitution, to wit:
[clause 1] "All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
[clause 2] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[clause 3] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." [Emphasis added] Exhibit 3
means only the "Constitution of the United States" as conclusively and positively identified in 1 Stat 23 Section 1, to wit:
"That the oath or affirmation required by the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States shall be administered in the form following, to wit: I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States." [Emphasis added] Exhibit 2
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that the name of the written instrument of the organic and fundamental law of 1789 is the only one true, correct and complete name, which is the "Constitution of the United States." And further, said true name was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in 920 cases from 1789 to 1890. Attached as a sample are thirty-two cases from the year 1789 to 1806. Exhibit 4
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that, arising under the first Act of Congress 1 Stat 23 Section 1, the form of the Oath to the Constitution of the United States arising under the sixth article of the Constitution of the United States is the following:
"I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution of the United States."
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that those people who shall take the Oath are all the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States arising under 1 Stat 23 Sec. 3 arising under the Constitution of the United States, to wit:
"SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That the members of the several State legislatures, at the next sessions of the said legislatures, respectively, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who have been heretofore chosen or appointed, or who shall be chosen or appointed before the first day of August next, and who shall then be in office, shall, within one month thereafter, take the same oath or affirmation, except where they shall have taken it before; which may be administered by any person authorized by the law of the State, in which such office shall be holden, to administer oaths. And the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who shall be chosen or appointed after the said first day of August, shall, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, take the foregoing oath or affirmation, which shall be administered by the person or person, who by the law of the State shall be authorized to administer the oath of office; and the person or persons so administering the oath hereby required to be taken, shall cause a record or certificate thereof to be made, in the same manner, as, by the law of the State, he or they shall be directed to record or certify the oath of office." [Emphasis added]
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that the Oath shall be taken by all the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices arising under 1 Stat 23 Sec. 3 arising under Article VI of the Constitution of the United States. Exhibits 2 & 3
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that this Oath shall apply to all members of the several State legislatures, , whether chosen (elected) or appointed, and to all executive and judicial officers of the several States arising under 1 Stat 23 Sec. 3, arising under Article VI of the Constitution of the United States. Exhibits 2 & 3
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that this Oath of all members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, shall be administered by a person or persons who by the law of the State shall be authorized to administer the oath of office arising under 1 Stat 23 Sec. 3 arising under the sixth Article of the Constitution of the United States. Exhibits 2 & 3
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that all members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States authorized to administer the Oath shall cause a record or certificate thereof to be made, in the same manner, as, by the law of the State, he or they shall be directed to record or certify the oath of office arising under 1 Stat 23 Sec. 3 arising Article VI of the Constitution of the United States.
High crime and misdemeanors are such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felony, yet, owing to some technical circumstance, do not fall within the definitions of "felony". State v. Knapp, 6 Conn. 417, 16 Am. Dec. 68. Exhibit 5 They are the more serious or aggravated misdemeanors; those more nearly allied and equal in guilt to felony, but which do not fall within its definition. Firmara v. Gardner, 86 Conn. 434, 85 A. 670, 672. Exhibit 6
"Nonfeasance" means the omission of an act which a person ought to do; "misfeasance" is the improper doing of an act which a person might lawfully do; and "malfeasance" is the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all. Blacks 4th Edition.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation of the sixth Article of the Constitution of the United States, Article IV and Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, render decisions, opinions, issue process, and void judgements and order in outlaw courts known as the "DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA, SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA, Exhibit 29, and the District Court of Anchorage, Exhibit 30, presided over by judges and magistrates with no Oath of Office for public Officers to the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, on the 17th day of August, in the year of our Lord, 1989, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the first Act of Congress of 1 Stat 23, Article IV and Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and laws of the State of Alaska, did the following acts, to wit:
Specification First. John E. Reese did sign an EMPLOYEE AFFIDAVIT as a mere employee, with the State of Alaska as the employer. This is unconstitutional and unlawful because a mere employee and a public officer are mutually exclusive, and such employee status is in direct conflict with the lawful requirements for Public Officers. "Employee" denotes one who stands in a contractual relationship to his employer, and a subordinate. An Employee Affidavit stands as proof of a master - servant relationship and of the status of a mere employee. Only a public Officer is empowered and invested with a portion of sovereignty of the state, to wit:
"There is a clear distinction between a public officer and a public employee, and a public officer as distinguished from a public employee, must be invested by law with a portion of the sovereignty of the state and authorized to exercise functions either of an executive, legislative or judicial character." Francis v. Iowa E.S.C., 98 N.W.2d 733 (1959) 735, 736 Exhibit 8 250 Iowa 1300; Aldin Independent School Dist. v. Standley, 280 S.W.2d 578 (1955), 583, 585 Exhibit 9 154 Tex. 547; State ex rel. Newman v. Skinner, 191 N.E. 127 (1934), 128 Exhibit 10 128 Ohio St. 325, 93 A.L.R. 331.
Specification Second. John E. Reese did sign the EMPLOYEE AFFIDAVIT in the status of only an employee, directly above the line of the "Signature of Employee." Exhibit 11.
Specification Third. John E. Reese did sign the EMPLOYEE AFFIDAVIT with the "Department" being "Judicial." "Department" is one of the divisions of the executive branch of government. This is violation of the separation of the branches of government and the Constitution of the United States guarantee that all States shall be "republican" in form. Exhibits 1 & 3
Specification Fourth. John E. Reese did sign the EMPLOYEE AFFIDAVIT in violation of the law of the state on affidavits requiring a jurat, seal and "Sworn and subscribed before me on Date", Signature of the Act of Chapter 37 of 1981 of the Legislature of the State of Alaska.
Specification Fifth. John E. Reese did sign the EMPLOYEE AFFIDAVIT with the exact words prescribed by Chapter 182, SLA 1959 which arise under the further oaths or affirmations by legislation arising under of Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, to wit:
SECTION 5. OATH OF OFFICE. All public officers, before entering upon the duties of their offices, shall take and subscribe to the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and that I will faithfully discharge my duties as . . . . . . . to the best of my ability." The legislature may prescribe further oaths or affirmations. [Emphasis added] Exhibit 1
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, nonfeasance, and malfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the first Act of Congress of 1 Stat 23, Article XII Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and laws of the State of Alaska, enter into the duties of his office without a civil commission.
Specification First. John E. Reese did unlawfully and unconstitutionally enter into the duties of his office without the civil commission arising under Law of Chapter 118 of 1929 of the Territory of Alaska compiled as CLA 1933, §1658 and again as compiled law in ACLA § 11-1-5 1949 and codified in ©Alaska Statutes, to wit:
The Law of chapter 118 of 1929 of the Territory of Alaska is as follows:
"Section 23. After each election, choice or appointment of any Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General or any Territorial officer, the Governor shall execute a commission, which commission shall state that the person to whom the same is issued has been duly appointed, chosen or elected, as the case may be, and the office to and the term for which he is so elected chosen or appointed.
The Attorney General shall prescribe the form for such commissions."
The CLA 1933, § 1658 is as follows
"Sec. 1658. Governor commissions officers. After each election, choice or appointment of any Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General or any Territorial officer, the Governor shall execute a commission, which commission shall state that the person to whom the same is issued has been duly appointed, chosen or elected, as the case may be, and the office to and the term for which he is so elected chosen or appointed.
The Attorney General shall prescribe the form for such commissions."
[L 1929, ch 118, § 23, p 232, effective May 2, 1929].
The compiled laws of 1949, § 11-1-5 ACLA is as follows:
" § 11-1-5. Commission to office; Issuance; Form and contents. After each election, choice or appointment of any Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General or any Territorial officer, the Governor shall execute a commission, which commission shall state that the person to whom the same is issued has been duly appointed, chosen or elected, as the case may be, and the office to and the term for which he is so elected chosen or appointed.
The Attorney General shall prescribe the form for such commissions."
[L 1929, ch 118, § 23, p 232, effective May 2, 1929; CLA 1933, § 1658].
The codified ©Alaska Statutes of AS 39.05.035 is as follows:
"Sec. 39.05.035. Commission of office
After each appointment of a state officer, the governor shall execute a commission, which states that the person to whom it is issued is appointed and the term for which the officer is appointed. The attorney general shall prescribe the form of the commission." [Emphasis added]
HISTORY: (§ 11-1-5 ACLA 1949)
Specification Second. John E. Reese did unlawfully and unconstitutionally enter into his public office without a civil commission. See the following adjudged decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, to wit:
1. The adjudged decision United States v. Le Baron, 60 U.S. 73 (1856), 78 Exhibit 12, to wit:
"When a person has been nominated to an office by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and his commission has been signed by the President, and the seal of the United States affixed thereto, his appointment to that office is complete. Congress may provide, as it has done in this case, that certain acts shall be done by the appointee before he shall enter on the possession of the office under his appointment. These acts then become conditions precedent to the complete investiture of the office; but they are to be performed by the appointee, not by the Executive; all that the Executive can do to invest the person with his office has been completed when the commission has been signed and sealed; and when the person has performed the required conditions, his title to enter on the possession of the office is also complete." [Emphasis added]
2. The adjudged decision of Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803), 157 Exhibit 13, to wit:
This is an appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, and is evidenced by no act but the commission itself. In such a case therefore the commission and the appointment seem inseparable; it being almost impossible to show an appointment otherwise than by proving the existence of a commission; still the commission is not necessarily the appointment; though conclusive evidence of it.
Specification Third. An example of a civil commission for the State is attached as evidence of the mandatory existence and form of a civil commission. Take particular attention that this civil commission empowers the justice, judge or magistrate by the authority vested by law in the governor. The term and powers of said office are defined.
And further, it is extremely important that this body take Mandatory Judicial Notice of the complete Civil Commission, Exhibit 14. And further, said commission is signed by the "Governor of Alaska", not the Governor of the State of Alaska. The seal and signature is of the "Secretary of the State", and not the Secretary of the State of Alaska. Of course, the Constitution of the State of Alaska only empowered a Legislature and Executive for the "State." And the superior and supreme court for the "State" and not the State of Alaska, which are two totally different entities.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation of the Article IV Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska enter into the duties of his office without a license to practice law in the State [not State of Alaska], to wit:
"SECTION 4. QUALIFICATIONS OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES. Supreme court justices and superior court judges shall be citizens of the United States and of the State, licensed to practice law in the State, and possessing any additional qualifications prescribed by law. Judges of other courts shall be selected in a manner, for terms, and with qualifications prescribed by law." [Emphasis added] Exhibit 1
According to the FOIA from Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd to John E. Reese on February 15, 2000 and answered by Marilyn May, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, on behalf of and for John E. Reese, she averred that John E. Reese has no such document. Exhibits 15 & 16. I, Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd have inspected all of the public records of the Alaska Court System on 4th Avenue made available in Anchorage, Alaska, and found no license to practice law in the State.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully, and in violation of the Article IV Section 4 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, enter into the duties of his office without possessing dual citizenship. Supra
Specification First. Pursuant to the FOIA from Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd to John E. Reese on February 15, 2000 and answered by Marilyn May, Clerk of the Appellate Courts, on behalf of and for John E. Reese, she averred that John E. Reese has no such document. Exhibits 15 and 16. And I, Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd have inspected all of the public records of the Alaska Court System on 4th Avenue and found no documents of dual citizenship.
Specification Second. John E. Reese is a registered voter under the penalties of perjury as possessing only single citizenship, being a citizen of the United States.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation of the Article IV Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska render decisions appealed from unlawful courts known as the "DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA, SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA, and the District Court of Anchorage. None of said courts are empowered under Article IV Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska as constitutional or legislatively created courts.
The lawful courts are the superior court for the State of Chapter 50 of 1959 by the Legislature of the State of Alaska, and District Magistrate Court of the State of Alaska of Chapter 184 of 1959 by the Legislature of the State of Alaska. Exhibits 17 & 18 respectively.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, did unlawfully and in violation the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Alaska, supports the abolishment of the lawfully enacted law of Chapter 50 of 1959 of the State of Alaska by Supreme Court Orders.
Specification First. Arising under the lawfully enacted Chapter 50 of 1959 of the Legislature of the State of Alaska, the people shall have a court of justice according to the common law. Furthermore, in said court of justice the people shall have the common-law writs such as the Writ of Mandamus [we command] and Writ of Quo Warranto [tests by what authority he who is exercising power is legally entitled to do so.]. But in Rule 91, we find said writs are abolished by SCO in the Alaska Rules of Court.
Specification Second. Arising under Chapter 50 of 1959 of the Legislature of the State of Alaska, Exhibit 17, we have the Enacted Law codified in ©AS 22.10.020 (c), to wit:
(c) The superior court and its judges may issue injunctions, writs of review, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction. A writ of habeas corpus may be made returnable before any judge of the superior court. [Emphasis added]
Specification Third. Pursuant to the Alaska Rules of Court that are used in the Outlaw Courts we find that the Enacted laws of the Legislature of the State of Alaska have been abolished by the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, to wit:
(a) Scire Facias -- Quo Warranto. -- The writs of scire facias and quo warranto, and proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto, are abolished. Relief available under those forms or under the provisions of statutes may be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules.
(b) Mandamus. -- The writ of mandamus is abolished. Relief heretofore available by mandamus as prescribed by statutes may be obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules.
(c) Administrative Subpoenas. -- These rules are applicable to proceedings in court to compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with subpoena issued or other authority exercised by an officer or agency of the state, except as otherwise provided by order of the court in the proceedings.
HISTORY: Adopted by SCO 5 October 9, 1959; amended by SCO 49 effective January 1, 1963 [Emphasis added]
Specification Fourth. Arising under Article II of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, only the legislature of the State is granted law-making authority. Arising under Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, there is no grant of law-making authority to judicial officers or to the judicial branch. Therefore Rule 91 used in the outlaw courts is unlawful and unconstitutional.
Specification Fifth. Pursuant to the Alaska Rules of Court on evidence, the judicial officers have empowered law-making powers onto themselves, to wit:
Rule 201. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FACT
(a) Scope of Rule. -- Rule 201 restricts only the power of the court to declare on the record, without resort to formal proof, that a particular fact exists, i.e., that something is actually true, where the fact involved is one that would otherwise be decided by the trier of fact upon submission of proof by the parties. No other practice falls within the scope of this Rule.
The term "judicial notice" has been indiscriminately applied to several different aspects of the decisional process. Many of these aspects will not be affected by this Rule.
One aspect not covered by Rule 201 involves assumptions made by the court in its determination of policy; e.g., that a particular change in the law would probably do more harm than good. This is not the sort of fact question that, in a jury trial, would normally be put to the jury, and so is not subsumed by Rule 201's definition of "judicial notice of fact." Rather than findings of fact, these are policy determinations made by the court acting in its lawmaking capacity. The court as lawmaker is held to the same standard as the legislature is for the veracity of its inferences: it must be rational. The court taking judicial notice of a fact as that term is used in Rule 201 is held to a different and more demanding standard--the same standard required for it to direct a verdict; it must be right, meaning that rational minds would not dispute the fact that the court notices.
Stated more specifically, Rule 201 does not bar:
(1) Common law rule-making on the basis of factual assumptions based on the court's familiarity with non-evidence sources. See e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
(2) Rule-making pursuant to a constitutional grant of authority on the basis of disputable factual assumptions. See, e.g., Rules of Evidence 407 and 408.
(3) Constitutional interpretation based upon disputable factual assumptions -- for example the balancing of interests in the vague area of due process.
(4) Judicial creation of remedies assumed to be necessary to carry out the legislative intent of a statute. [Emphasis added]
Specification Sixth. Arising under the Act of Chapter 50 of 1959 of the Legislature of the State of Alaska, the lawful seal was repealed only in the Alaska Code by § 21 chapter 64 SLA 1974. And further Kathy Franklin did produce the seal of the superior court for the State arising under the Act of Chapter 50 of 1959.
This seal is kept in the back area in the Anchorage Court System on 4th Avenue in Anchorage, Alaska, and is available only by direct request. This seal has been used by Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd in case 3AN-98-11676 [CF] on December 30, 1998, Exhibit 19, sealed by the correct seal on Summons that had to be hand typed, as no such Summons exist for the lawful superior court of the State. This body shall take Mandatory Judicial Notice of the existence of this seal, of a dual court system, even though this court of justice and its seal are hidden from the people of Alaska.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, is a current member of the Alaska Bar Association , in violations of the laws of the Territory of Alaska.
Specification First. Arising under the Act of Chapter 196 of 1955 of the Legislature of the Territory of Alaska, to wit:
"Sec. 4. NEW MEMBERS. After the organization of the Alaska Bar, as herein provided, all persons who are admitted to practice in accordance with the provisions of this Act, except judges of courts of record, shall upon admission become eligible for active membership in the Alaska Bar." [Emphasis added] Exhibit 20.
Specification Second. Pursuant to a letter from Deborah ORegan, John E. Reese with Bar number 6503014, is a member in good standing with the Alaska Bar Association. Exhibit 21.
Specification Third. Arising under Article IV of the Constitution of the State of Alaska and the Act of Chapter 50 of 1959 of the Legislature of the State of Alaska, the Supreme and Superior Courts are courts of record according to the course of the common law. Therefore it is unconstitutional and unlawful for any judge or justice in these courts to be a member of the Alaska Bar Association. Exhibit 17.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, has determined questions of right in a lawful court of justice pursuant to the Administrative Rule 34 of the Alaska Rules of Court, which states that all justice, judges, clerks and employees are covered by the blanket bond that also covers other state employees.
Specification First. And further, arising under the Act of Chapter 29 of 1943 of the Legislature of the Territory of Alaska, and also arising under Article XV Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska, and codified in the ©Alaska Statutes in Section 39.15 et seq.
Arising under the Act of 29 of Chapter of 1943 supra, to wit
Section 3. and to and for the use and benefit of all persons who may be injured or aggrieved by the wrongful act or default of such officer or employee in his official capacity or employment and any person so injured or aggrieved may bring suit on such bond in his or her name without an assignment thereof. [Emphasis added]
[and]
Section 7. the officer whose duty it is or may be to approve such bond shall not accept or approve any such bond, except it be that of a surety company duly qualified to do business in the Territory, unless the sureties thereon shall severally justify before an officer authorized to administer oaths as follows: (1) that he is a resident and freeholder within this Territory; (2) that he is worth double the amount for which he becomes surety over and above all his debts and liabilities in property situated within this Territory which is not exempt from any seizure and sale under execution. [Emphasis added]
[and]
Section 10. If any Territorial officer or employee shall fail to file within fifteen days from the date of personal service the office or appointment of the person or officer so failing shall become vacant and such person or officer shall forfeit his office or appointment, and the same shall be filled as in other cases of vacancy, and in manner provided by law; [Emphasis added]
This Act clearly states that the purpose of an Official Bond is to benefit all of the people of Alaska. Anyone may bring suit if injured or aggrieved on the Official Bond in his or her name without assignment.
Specification Second. Now if we look at the Policy No. GVT 124-38-70-00, Exhibit 22, provided by WILLIS CORRON CORPORATION OF SEATTLE with the policy provided by GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. with the name of the insured being STATE OF ALASKA, we find the following:
C. GENERAL DEFINITOINS
1. "Employee" means:
a. Any natural person
(1) while in your [State of Alaska] service (and for 30 days after termination of service);
and
(2) whom you compensate directly by salary, wages or commissions;
and
(3) whom you [State of Alaska] have the right to direct and control while performing services for you [State of Alaska];
and
b. Sole Benefit: This insurance is for your [State of Alaska] sole benefit. No legal proceedings of any kind to recover on account of loss under this coverage may be brought by anyone other than you. [Emphasis added]
Therefore, this surety is in reality an employee dishonesty bond for the sole benefit of the STATE OF ALASKA and explicitly demonstrates that this surety is not a replacement for an Official Bond, nor is it an Official Bond. This is in direct conflict and unlawful under the Act for Official Bonds, supra. This language explicitly demonstrates a master-servant relationship and states outright that the STATE OF ALASKA has the right to direct and control each employee, be it a judge, justice, clerk, etc., while performing services for the State of Alaska.
And further, Section seven of the Act of Chapter 29 of 1943 of the Legislature of the Territory of Alaska mandates that the surety company be duly qualified to do business in the Territory, unless the sureties there shall severally justify (1) that he is a resident and freeholder within the Territory; (2) that he is worth double the amount of which he becomes a surety. Neither of these mandatory conditions has been met by WILLIS CORROON CORPORATION OF SEATTLE or GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE CO by being registered to do business as foreign corporation in the Territory, and a fiction cant be a freeholder. There is no evidence that any natural person has any Official Bond based on their own property.
Specification Third. And further pursuant to Administrative Rules of the Alaska Court System Rule 34, the Alaska Court System avers that all of its employees are to be covered by the blanket bond just like other state employees. This also affirms the status of the judges, justices, magistrates and all employees as mere employees of the STATE OF ALASKA under its direct control. And further, Administrative Rule 34 affirms that all purported public office holders, whether judges, justices, clerks, magistrates, or employees are to be covered by an Official Bond.
The status of John E. Reese as mere a employee is further validated by his signature on the Employee Affidavit as an employee, his lack of the civil commission mandated by the Act of Chapter 118 of 1929 of the Legislature of the Territory of Alaska [§ 11-1-5 ACLA & ©AS 39.05.035] and his lack of a proper Oath of Office to the Constitution of the United States arising under the sixth Article of the Constitution of the United States, (the very first Act of Congress in volume 1 on page 23) 1 Stat 23, and Article XII section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Alaska.
Specification Fourth. Pursuant to a letter from Ted Lehrback, Risk Manager, on behalf of J. Brad Thompson Director of April 12, 2000 prepared by the Department of Law, the Official Bond Requirements are satisfied by this Employee Dishonesty Bond. Of course this isnt correct, and is unlawful and unconstitutional.
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
That said John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, unmindful of the high duties of his public office, of the mandatory oath of his public office, of the mandatory civil commission of his public office and of the requirement of the Constitution the United States and the Constitution of the State of Alaska, that he should take care that he shall not enter into the duties of his public office until certain acts are performed and that the laws are faithfully administered, in construing law, application of the facts, determine questions of right in a lawful court of justice, only has authority in a "court of justice."
And further, if said John E. Reese operates outside of the constitutional courts of justice or takes appeals from unlawful and unconstitutional courts, he has no authority.
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice of the following compiled laws, code and original Law of the State of Oregon of October 11, 1862 as the true words of the Act. The following are the compiled laws, code and source law of the State of Oregon: ©AS 22.20.010, the compiled laws of §54-2-1 ACLA 1949, CLA 1933 § 3305, CLA 1913 § 1539, Carter Code sec. 707, Hills Annotate Code § 913, Public Acts and Code of Oregon §886 of the Act of October 11, 1862.
And further to validate the correct words and authority for a "judicial officer", we are mandated to proceed as follows.
Sec. 22.20.010. Judicial officer defined
"The term "judicial officer" means a supreme court justice, including the chief justice, a judge of the court of appeals, a judge of the superior court, a district judge, and a magistrate." [Emphasis added]
HISTORY: (§ 54-2-1 ACLA 1949; am § 16 ch 12 SLA 1980)
AS 22.20.020
Sec. 22.20.020.Disqualification of judicial officer for cause
(a) A judicial officer may not act in a matter in which
(1) the judicial officer is a party;
(2) the judicial officer is related to a party or a party's attorney by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
(3) the judicial officer is a material witness;
(4) the judicial officer or the spouse of the judicial officer, individually or as a fiduciary, or a child of the judicial officer has a direct financial interest in the matter;
(5) a party, except the state or a municipality of the state, has retained or been professionally counseled by the judicial officer as its attorney within two years preceding the assignment of the judicial officer to the matter;
(6) the judicial officer has represented a person as attorney for the person against a party, except the state or a municipality of the state, in a matter within two years preceding the assignment of the judicial officer to the matter;
(7) an attorney for a party has represented the judicial officer or a person against the judicial officer, either in the judicial officer's public or private capacity, in a matter within two years preceding the filing of the action;
(8) the law firm with which the judicial officer was associated in the practice of law within the two years preceding the filing of the action has been retained or has professionally counseled either party with respect to the matter;
(9) the judicial officer feels that, for any reason, a fair and impartial decision cannot be given.
(b) A judicial officer shall disclose, on the record, a reason for disqualification specified in (a) of this section at the commencement of a matter in which the judicial officer participates. The disqualifications specified in (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), and (a)(8) of this section may be waived by the parties and are waived unless a party raises an objection.
(c) If a judicial officer is disqualified on the officer's own motion or consents to disqualification, the presiding judge of the district shall immediately transfer the action to another judge of that district to which the objections of the parties do not apply or are least applicable and if there is no such judge, the chief justice of the supreme court shall assign a judge for the hearing or trial of the action. If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court. The hearing may be ex parte and without notice to the parties or judge."
HISTORY: (§ 54-2-1 ACLA 1949; am § 1 ch 48 SLA 1967; am § § 10, 11 ch 38 SLA 1987; am § 38 ch 50 SLA 1989)
"§54-2-1. Judicial officer defined: Disqualification. A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. Such officer shall not act as such in a court of which he is a member in any of the following cases:
First. In an action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is directly interested;
Second. When he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision;
Third. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
Fourth. When he has been attorney in an action or proceeding in question for either party;
Fifth. Whenever any party, or any attorney for any party, to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party, or attorney for a opposite party, to the suit, and that it is made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed within one day after such action, suit, or proceeding is at issue upon a question of fact, or good cause shall be shown for the failure to file it within such time. No party or attorney shall be entitled to file more than one such affidavit in any case. The provisions of this subdivision shall apply only to the District Court.
But this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial or the regulation of the order of business in court. In the cases specified in subdivisions three and four the disqualification may be waived by the parties and shall be deemed to be waived unless an application be made as provided in this code." CLA 1913, § 1539; CLA 1933, §3305, am 54 Stat 16 [Emphasis added]
3. CLA 1933, §3305 "Sec. 3305. Judicial officer, definition of. When disqualified to act. A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. Such officer shall not act as such in a court of which he is a member in any of the following cases:
First. In an action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is directly interested;
Second. When he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision;
Third. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
Fourth. When he has been attorney in an action or proceeding in question for either party;
But this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial or the regulation of the order of business in court. In the cases specified in subdivisions three and four the disqualification may be waived by the parties and shall be deemed to be waived unless an application be made as provided in this title." (1539-CLA) [Emphasis added]
4. 1539-CLA "SEC 1539 . A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. Such officer shall not act as such in a court of which he is a member in any of the following cases:
First. In an action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is directly interested;
Second. When he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision;
Third. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
Fourth. When he has been attorney in an action or proceeding in question for either party;
But this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial or the regulation of the order of business in court. In the cases specified in subdivisions three and four the disqualification may be waived by the parties and shall be deemed to be waived unless an application be made as provided in this code." [Emphasis added]
Carter Code, sec. 707; Charlton Code, sec 707
First. In an action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is directly interested;
Second. When he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision;
Third. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
Fourth. When he has been attorney in an action or proceeding in question for either party;
But this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial or the regulation of the order of business in court. In the cases specified in subdivisions three and four the disqualification may be waived by the parties and shall be deemed to be waived unless an application be made as provided in this code." [Emphasis added]
Laws Oreg., Oct. 11, 1862; Hills Ann. Laws, s, 913.
6. Hills Ann. Laws, s, 913 "§ 913. [886] A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. Such officer shall not act as such in a court of which he is a member in any of the following cases: --
First. In an action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is directly interested;
Second. When he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision;
Third. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
Fourth. When he has been attorney in an action or proceeding in question for either party;
But this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial or the regulation of the order of business in court. In the cases specified in subdivisions 3 and 4, and, except in the supreme court, shall be deemed to be waived, unless an application for a change of the place of trial be made as provided in this code." Emphasis added]
6. "886. A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice. Such officer shall not act as such in a court of which he is a member in any of the following cases: --
First. In an action or proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is directly interested;
Second. When he was not present and sitting as a member of the court at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision;
Third. When he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree;
Fourth. When he has been attorney in an action or proceeding in question for either party;
But this section does not apply to an application to change the place of trial or the regulation of the order of business in court. In the cases specified in subdivisions 3 and 4, and, except in the supreme court, shall be deemed to be waived, unless an application for a change of the place of trial be made as provided in this code." Oct. 11,1862 [Emphasis added] Exhibit 23.
And further this body shall take Notice that the true, correct and complete words enacted into law in Oregon are the following: "A judicial officer is a person authorized to act as a judge in a court of justice." Exhibit 23 .
Therefore, John E. Reese, Superior Court Judge and/or judge of the Superior Court, is guilty of a high crime, malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that Annotated Compiled Laws of Alaska of 1949 (hereafter ACLA 1949) is only Compiled Law, not positive law, and therefore it is necessary to go to the source of the statute.
And further in Ashley v. City of Anchorage, 95 F. Supp.189 (1951), 191 Exhibit 24, we find the following:
"ACLA is a compilation only and not positive law, and, therefore, it is necessary to go to the source of the statute."
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that we as American citizens are entitled to a lawful judge in the first instance, not relying in some appellate process or trial de novo.
And further this court shall take mandatory Judicial Notice of the adjudged decision of the Supreme Court of the United States of case Ward v Village of Monroeville, 409 US 57, 61,62, Exhibit 25, to wit:
"Respondent also argues that any unfairness at the trial level can be corrected on appeal and trial de novo in the County Court of Common Pleas. We disagree. This "procedural safeguard" does not guarantee a fair trial in the mayor's court; there is nothing to suggest that the incentive to convict would be diminished by the possibility of reversal on appeal. Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance." [emphasis added]
This body shall take mandatory Judicial Notice that were a court is without jurisdiction in the particular case, its acts and proceedings can be of no force or validity, and are a mere nullity and void, not voidable, even prior to reversal, whether the lack of jurisdiction appears on the face of the record or by proof outside of it.
And further this court shall take mandatory Judicial Notice of the adjudged decision of the case of Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920), Exhibit 26, of the Supreme Court of the United States, to wit:
"Courts are constituted by authority and they can not go beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal." [Emphasis added] Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 344; Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8.
And further this court shall take Judicial Notice of the case of Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807) arising under the Supreme Court of the United States (Exhibit 27). In this case, Chief Justice Marshall stated the following:
Crimes so atrocious as those which have for their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment, because they have not ripened into treason. [Emphasis added]
This body or court shall take Mandatory Judicial Notice of all of the facts and law contained herein.
I, Ralph Kermit Winterrowd 2nd, do affirm that the information and facts are true, correct, complete to the best of my knowledge. I come without the assistance of an attorney or lawyer.
Sworn and subscribed before me this 25th day of April of the year 2000.
I certify that these Articles of Impeachment were personally served, mailed via U.S. Mail or left at the office of with on , 2000.
Signature